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County Government Institutions and Local Land Use Regulation 
 
Growth management policy decisions are political choices.   Land use regulation 
can result in efficiency gains, but it also has distributive consequences.   To date, 
motivations based in distributive consequences have not been given sufficient attention in 
efforts to explain when and where specific growth policies have been employed.  
Molotch (1976) depicted cities as an aggregate of competing land-based interests where 
decisions regarding growth determine who gets what.  These interests refer not only to 
competition for economic development but also to interests pursuing exclusion or quality 
of life objectives under the heading of growth management.  The consequences of growth 
management make it inherently distributive. 
What factors account for local land use practices?   While we know much about 
land use controls, such as zoning regulation and growth caps, we know far less about 
what factors account for restrictions on land use that result from comprehensive planning 
processes or rely on market incentives.   Much attention has focused on state level 
adoption of growth management and planning mandates, but far less on local policies.   
Several important questions have not been addressed including local response to state 
mandates, efforts to reduce uncertainty in land regulation processes, the choices of policy 
instruments, and the role of political institutions.    
Local governments exercise considerable discretion in term of how they 
implement comprehensive planning requirements.  Inattention to how local regulations 
and planning responded to state mandates is particularly unfortunate because of the 
tremendous variation in the restrictiveness of regulatory processes at the local level 
(Feiock 1994; Anthony 2000; Feiock et al 2002).    
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The stability of land use rules is also deserving of additional attention.  Extant 
research focuses attention on restrictions and costs resulting from land use rules but not 
the stability of those rules.   This issue is particularly salient because recent work 
suggests that transaction costs from regulatory uncertainty increases development costs 
(Mayer and Sommerville 2000; Feiock and Stream 2001).    
Choices among regulatory and market instruments for managing growth also have 
not been systematically investigated.  The public policy literature directs attention to the 
specific policy instruments that governments employ to purse policy goals (Salamon, 
1989; Weimer and Vining, 1999; Peters and van Nispen, 1998; Salamon, 2001; Feiock 
Tavares and Stream, 2001).  There are a wide array of regulatory and market based policy 
tools for managing growth.   
We investigate the choices and dimensions of local growth management efforts 
by applying a framework that examines how local government institutions along with 
community preferences and political forces influence local growth management.   We 
find that the institutional features of county governments in Florida shape incentives to 
control or manage growth and the policy instruments county governments employ in 
pursuit of these goals. 
 
The Political Economy of Land Use Planning 
Government institutions are important in land use because transaction costs in 
settling land use conflicts are often high.  This is because property rights are not always 
clearly defined and easy to enforce, measurement of the effects of different kinds of 
externalities may be costly, and the amount of information available to homeowners and 
developers may be asymmetric (Barzel 1989).       
 2
The literature on distributive policymaking model applied to zoning adoptions by 
Arthur Denzau and Barry Weingast (1982) and later by James Clinermayer (1993; 2001) 
is valuable to understanding both regulatory and market based growth management 
policies.  This explanation assumes public officials seek re-election by providing their 
constituencies with particularized benefits financed by broader constituencies.  Since 
benefits are concentrated, local officials can easily claim credit for them.  Yet because 
costs are diffused, the same officials can easily duck blame (Mayhew 1974).   The 
specific land-use choices that local governments make reflect efforts to minimize 
political transaction costs incurred in dealing with contradictory goals among local  
constituencies.   Because different groups and actors in a community have different 
attitudes and preferences regarding growth, land use decisions have highly political and 
distributive impacts.  
Zoning is commonly used for purposes of exclusion (Heilbrun, 1987).   Zoning 
variances and other land use modifications also have distributive consequence because 
changes to the rules of the game create winners and losers such as when developers or 
environmental interests lobby for and receive a zoning variance or land use change that 
breaks with previously established restrictions.   A land use controls with similar 
distributive consequences is development impact development fees.  Impact fees focus 
local officials’ attention upon the preferences of politically salient existing residents 
(voters) and new comers may have little voice in the adoption of this land use 
management tool (Beatley, 1988; Nelson, 1995). 
Still different goals and interests may be involved in the use of density bonuses or 
incentive zoning that allows private developers to buy out certain existing zoning 
restrictions in exchange for the provision of social equipment such as affordable housing, 
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day care centers, and job training (Kayden, 1992; Rubin, Seneca, and Stotsky, 1990; 
Schiffman, 1989). Adoption of these policy tools may reflect communities characteristics 
more in diverse, highly dense, and less wealthy communities because the opposition to 
these initiatives is less likely. 
Land use policy could be the means by which high income individuals isolate 
themselves from lower-income individuals and therefore increase their property values 
and lower the cost of supplying local public goods (Maser, Riker, and Rosett 1977; 
Ihlanfeldt 2001). Responsiveness to constituency characteristics or imputed preferences 
in land use decisions has been found in much of the research on local zoning regulations 
(e.g., Fischel 1985; Hinds and Ordway 1986; Danielson  1976; Clingermayer  1993; 
2001).   The demands of these interests are shaped and aggregated by local political 
institutions. 
Community Characteristics and Land Use Policy Choices 
In examining how political institutions shape land use choices we need to take 
into account local demands, growth preferences and political forces.  We expect 
characteristics of communities such as wealth, education and race to reflect preferences 
for slow growth and exclusion.   Previous work describes a strong connection between 
income or affluence and growth management efforts.    The literature portrays a social 
class bias in the adoption of growth controls (Navarro and Carson, 1991; Bollens, 1990; 
Donovan and Neiman, 1992).    Communities with a higher per capita personal income 
and educational attainment levels and smaller poverty populations are expected to have a 
greater commitment to growth management land use controls.   We also expect to find 
racial homogeneity to be an important predictor of the restrictiveness of the 
comprehensive planning process.   
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   Communities with large and growing populations are expected to have more 
restrictive growth management.     While these factors have been linked to growth 
management in general, questions of how they affect choices of specific policy tools to 
control or manage growth have gone unanswered. 
Most recently, community preferences have been linked to the restrictiveness and 
stability of comprehensive plans (Feiock 2001).  Neo-institutional work argues that 
political institutions are central to local government policy (Clingermayer and Feiock 
2001; Sharp forthcoming).   The theoretical underpinning of this role is derived from the 
study of structural reforms introduced by the progressive reform movement, and builds 
upon decades of institutional scholarship on local governments (Salisbury, 1969;  
Lineberry and Fowler, 1967; Ostrom, Bish and Ostrom, 1988).  Nevertheless, with a few 
exceptions (Sharp and Elkins, 1991; Fleischman and Green, 1992; Feiock 2002), this 
literature has not addressed development, growth control, and growth management 
policy.   In addition, almost all of the attention of urban institutionalists has been on 
municipal governments, ignoring the important role that counties play in land use 
decisions 
County Political Institutions 
Specific institutional arrangements affect the responsiveness of political choices 
to economic conditions.  These include the characteristics of executive and legislative 
branches of county government as well as the centralization or decentralization of 
governments in a county.    The Progressive reform movement changed the structure of 
city government and, at the municipal level, instituted city managers, at-large councils, 
and nonpartisan elections. Counties, however, were largely left behind by the reformers. 
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Counties are characterized by unique legal distinctions not applicable to many 
other local governments.  Following British precedent, American counties were created 
as administrative arms of the state to provide local residents with judicial, electoral, and 
other services as a convenience to state government’s exercise of power over large 
territory.  State legislatures delegate powers, modify previous grants of authority, and 
pass other legislation essential for the functioning of county governments.  
 Counties generally have less authority over their form of government structure 
than do municipalities since home rule authority extends only as far as the constitution 
and statutes of a state allow. In nearly half of the states, counties are still essentially 
“Dillon’s Rule” governments, having only those powers which are specifically and 
expressly delegated to them.  Even in these states a partial or limited delegation of home 
rule authority can allow counties to select organizational forms.  Among the 48 states 
with county governments, 37 permit some type of home rule authority. Of those, two 
dozen permit counties the opportunity to adopt a home rule charter; the others give 
counties a restricted grant of home rule authority. 
In recent years county government forms have changed more than city forms, but 
a majority of counties still do not exercise home rule. Most counties have not taken 
advantage of the option to adopt home rule charters, but there has been more willingness 
to centralize executive authority and policy-making.   Counties generally follow one of 
three forms of government: the commission, commission/administrator, and council-
executive.  The commission form is the traditional “unreformed” county government in 
which an elected commission exercises both legislative and executive authority. The 
commission usually selects a member to be the presiding officer. Typically, 
commissioners are elected by district. Members of the governing body divide 
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responsibilities to serve as department heads, or to oversee specific departments.   Elected 
county commissioners are more heavily involved in operations than are city council 
members; only in counties does the governing body directly manage specific agencies.  
Commissioners often compete with a wide variety of autonomous or partially 
autonomous elected “row officers.”  Row officers typically depend on the county’s 
governing board for funding.   
The persistence of the commission form in county government is a visible 
reminder that the Progressive reform movement largely bypassed county government. 
Few cities today use the commission form, opting instead for council-manager or the 
mayor-council form.   The majority of U.S. counties retain the commission as their 
organizational design. About a third of counties operate under a commission/executive 
system that grants legislative authority to a commission or council, but also employs an 
appointed county manager or administrator who manages the county day-to-day affairs. 
Thus, while a majority of counties still operate under the commission form, substantial 
numbers have shifted to the commission/administrator (manager) form.  The International 
City and County Management Association (ICMA) recognizes over 300 counties that 
generally meet the requirements of the single executive, with over 60 percent of those 
located in the South 
 The elected executive plan is employed in over 60 of the larger county 
governments in the U.S.   Generally, larger urban counties adopt this structure. Unlike the 
other forms, the elected executive form retains separation of powers.  Elected county 
executives have the authority to veto ordinances enacted by the board or commission, and 
the governing board does not have overriding power with a majority vote. Strong 
executives formulate and administer budgets, appoint key administrators with council 
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approval, and provide executive-style political leadership.  The elected executive form 
mirrors the strong mayoral system, which was the object of attack by the progressive 
reform movement.   Elected county executives in the United States are analogous to 
strong mayors in municipalities However, row officers are still elected in many of these 
counties, thus sharing the executive function.  The political science literature suggests 
that a popularly elected executive officer provides greater access to decision-making.  
Elected executive forms of government attract leaders with different orientations, values, 
and career interests than serve under other forms of government. 
Commission and elected executive forms have generally been considered more 
responsive to popular demands and pressures than commission-administrator structures 
that tend to insulate local decisions from demands and pressures in the community 
(Lineberry and Fowler, 1967; Marando and Thomas 1977).    The election of the 
executive offers a different opportunity structure for local leaders.  Elected executives are 
expected to be attuned to political credit claiming opportunities and have incentives for 
growth management entrepreneurism.   The benefits available to potential entrepreneurs, 
and therefore the incentives for action, are largely a product of the powers of office. 
Schneider, Teske, and Mintrom (1995) found the presence of a strong elected executive 
position in local government was related to the emergence of  pro and anti-growth 
entrepreneurs in cities.  
Elaine Sharp (forthcoming) argues that the more politicized character of elected 
executives translates into outcomes that are responsive to interest group activism and 
mass political pressures as well as being more favorable toward entrepreneurial action 
and its associated credit-claiming opportunities.   Conversely, because appointed 
executives have a greater orientation toward efficiency and economic development (Stein 
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1991), outcomes under council manager or commission governments may reflect a higher 
level of insulation from growth management pressures. 
More than two-thirds of county governing boards have three to five members but 
some have as many as 50.  Each commissioner may direct one or more functional 
departments and also have a policymaking role.   County charters may require 
commissioners to be elected at-large, by district or a some combination of at-large and 
district representation.   District representation may create support for policies that 
concentrate benefits on specific geographic areas, but it may impede policies that require 
cooperation or exchange.   The character of local politics is also shaped by the 
configuration of local governments in a community. Because cities will likely resist 
county-wide regulation, where there are more municipal governments in a county we 
expect less restrictive growth management programs.    
 
Land Use Choices  
 There are a number of approaches available to communities to manage growth.  
Two broad categories are regulatory and market based strategies, but within and between 
these categories multiple policy instruments are available.   Regulatory approaches 
include first generation growth controls such as zoning and building caps, but also 
include comprehensive planning restrictions on land use and urban service boundaries.   
There is near consensus that regulatory policies raise housing prices because they 
reduce the supply of land or its developmental potential (Dowall, 1981; Schwartz, 
Hansen, and Green, 1981; Denzau and Weingast, 1982; Landis, 1986; Engle, Navarro, 
and Carson, 1992).   
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While still not widely used, market approaches have become increasingly popular. 
Market tools include transfer of development rights, incentive zoning or density bonuses, 
and development impact fees.     Even though regulation of land uses has the potential to 
reduce uncertainty costs faced by consumers/movers as compared to an unregulated 
market, there are other ways of accomplishing the same goal, and possibly improve the 
actual market allocation in terms of minimization of transaction costs.  Mills (1989) 
suggests the transfer of development rights (TDR) is one possible alternative.   TDR 
assumes that the development rights of a parcel, as part of the right to convert, can be 
sold and used in another parcel. The motivation for the creation of a TDR program is 
often the preservation of environmentally sensitive areas, agricultural land, open space, 
and historic landmarks (Schiffman, 1989). 
Incentive zoning or density bonus is a fairly recent land use practice which works 
in the opposite direction of traditional zoning. While zoning is concerned with avoiding 
negative externalities between land uses and works to limit these conflicting uses, 
incentive zoning allows developers to build at higher density in exchange for the 
provision of social and environmental amenities producing positive externalities such as 
parks, opens space areas, schools, affordable housing (Goldberg and Chinloy, 1984).  
This growth management technique is also considered a market-based approach, since the 
price at which the local government buys each amenity is the amount of bonus provided 
to the developer. The determination of the optimal price, however, is difficult to achieve 
because local governments can only recognize if an incentive was sufficient to engage the 
developers in the transaction, not if it exceeded the optimal price. Additional social costs 
are imposed when “too much” bonus is given to developers. 
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Impact fees are generally regarded as tools to manage (or even limit) growth 
because they shift the burden of financing new infrastructure from existing owners to 
developers.  Nevertheless,  Nelson (1995) contends impact fees increase the supply of 
developable land and facility capacity to deal with demand.   Development impact fees 
have distributive consequences similar to zoning ordinances (Nelson, 1995; Snyder and 
Stegman, 1987; Phillips and Goodstein 2000). In a competitive market, the burden of the 
fee falls on consumers and landowners (O’Sullivan, 1996), producing distributive 
consequences by excluding moderate and low-income families from the jurisdiction 
(Nelson, 1995).   
 
Political Transaction Costs and Regulatory Growth Controls 
. Concentrating upon the social and economic benefits and costs of growth controls 
allows us to better establish the motivation for their adoption.  Even if specific choices 
may not be economically efficient,  they are valued by local officials because they 
minimize political transaction costs incurred in dealing with contradictory goals among 
their constituencies 
Communities where moderate and low-income families prevail may be less likely 
to rely on market approaches to growth management. The opposite might occur in 
wealthier communities, where exclusion of these groups might be achieved through the 
implementation of this type of land use instrument. Either way, the decision regarding 
land use policies rests primarily in the hands of local officials who may be primarily 
concerned with the maximization of their political goals. This may be particularly real in 
the case of market based growth controls if local officials focus attention upon the 
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preferences of existing residents (voters) to the neglect of other interests (Beatley, 1988; 
Nelson, 1995). 
Commitment costs can be minimized when elected decision-makers choose the 
combination of tools that can yield them reelection. We expect regulatory growth 
controls are most likely to be adopted in predominantly white and conservative 
communities where growth pressures are being felt and the power of interest groups is 
generally less relevant with the exception of neighborhood associations. Hence, local 
officials will find more support to commit to growth control strategies in this context. 
Once enacted in this context, these policies may be difficult to reverse due to local 
opposition and high electoral costs incurred by local governments. Because growth 
controls are often exclusionary in nature, local officials find it politically beneficial to 
adopt them to the benefit of local residents and detriment of newcomers. 
We expect form of local government to be a good predictor of the adoption of 
certain growth controls.  Specifically, because commission/administrator governments 
are more insulated from political influence and more attentive to inefficiencies generated 
by growth, we expect actions to manage rather than control growth. Elected executive-
council governments are anticipated to be more likely to respond to constituency political 
pressure; and frequently modify land use decisions to accommodate development and 
environmental demands. 
 
Political Transaction Costs and Market Techniques  
Reliance on the market to regulate land use produces different patterns of support 
and distributive consequences from traditional land use controls. Commission-
administrator governments may tend to favor certain growth management techniques 
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because they help redirect growth at lower cost when compared to command-and-control 
instruments. More liberal communities may favor these policies over growth controls 
because they are thought to be less exclusionary.   Market based growth management 
techniques are generally thought to be less intrusive than regulatory growth controls.  
Administrative costs of market based growth management techniques should be lower 
than regulatory approaches of less government intervention. The exceptions to this rule 
are transfer of development rights (TDR) programs that may involve the creation of TDR 
banks managed by local and/or state governments and, therefore, become costly to 
administer.   On the other hand, incentive zoning and impact fees are used frequently as a 
means to provide infrastructure and amenities at lesser cost in situations where local 
governments are experiencing financial stress (Urban Land Institute, 2001). 
Some distinctions can be made among these market based growth management 
instruments. TDR programs and impact fees may be preferred in communities with larger 
percentages of white, more affluent and educated citizens and homeowners because 
homogeneity facilitates exchange.  On the other hand, the relationship between these 
socio-economic factors and density bonus adoption might be negative since, in the 
majority of cases, this policy tool is associated with affordable housing provision and 
higher densities. 
Finally, there is a clear ideological dimension to the choice of instrument.  We 
expect market based regulatory approaches are more likely to be adopted in ideologically 
conservative areas and land use regulations are more likely in liberal communities 
(Kayden, 1992). 
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Growth Management Regulation in Florida  
 Land use management involves conflicts of interests between opposing views and 
interests. The decisions of local officials reflect a balance of the conflicting interests and, 
responses to pressures exerted in the context of decision-making.  Florida’s growth 
management effort has sought to reduce the social and environmental costs and 
externalities resulting from rapid growth, preserve desirable community attributes, and 
ensure orderly and responsible development (DeGrove, 1992; Stein, 1993).  Critics argue 
that these benefits come at a substantial cost in lost development. 
Florida has been at the forefront of land use planning for growth management.   
Explosive growth in the last half of the twentieth century prompted several pieces of 
legislation requiring local comprehensive planning as a mechanism to manage growth.  In 
1975, the Florida Legislature passed the Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act 
(LGCPA) which required the adoption of a comprehensive plan by every general purpose 
local government in the state.  The impact of the LGCPA was limited by the lack of 
substantial new funding to support local planning efforts, and the lack of enforcement 
mechanisms to assure local compliance.  The 1980s extended Florida’s quiet revolution. 
In 1985, the Legislature adopted the Local Government Comprehensive Planning and 
Land Development Regulation Act.  This Growth Management Act of 1985 centralized 
comprehensive planning at the state level and set minimum criteria for local 
comprehensive plans. Local governments prepared comprehensive growth management 
plans that were subject to review and acceptance by the Florida Department of 
Community Affairs (DCA).   Land development regulations were required to be 
consistent with the local comprehensive plan. Final plans were approved in the early and 
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mid 1990s.   The revised land development regulations based on the plans were 
implemented shortly afterwards.  
    In addition, concurrency provisions to the GMA adopted in 1986 mandate 
adequate public facilities be available "concurrent with the impacts" of new development 
and have increased housing prices  (Anthony 2000),  reduced new housing starts and 
limited the physical supply of housing (Feiock 1994; Denslow 1993) and reduced 
housing affordability (Anthony 2000; 2001).  
 
Research Design 
Dependent Variables.  We examine three regulatory and three market based 
growth management programs employed by county governments in Florida.    The first 
regulatory policy measure is the number of provisions and restrictions specified in growth 
management comprehensive plans.  For our second measure, we track the stability of 
growth management plans over time.  Third we examine the use of urban service 
boundaries.  The first two measures were derived from an ongoing study of Florida 
comprehensive planning documents.  The third was derived from a survey of county 
planning directors.        
During summer and fall 2001 we analyzed the comprehensive plans submitted by 
66 of the 67 Florida counties on file at the Planning Library of Florida DCA in 
Tallahassee.   The state mandates a standard format for local comprehensive plans that 
requires local governments to enumerate goals, objectives, and policies within each of 
seven plan elements.     The goals are general statements of purpose, the objectives are 
more specific strategies to achieve the goals, and the policies are specific policies, 
program or restrictions that implement the strategy.   These policies are required to be 
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incorporated into the local building and land development regulations.    The 
comprehensive plan elements for which these policies directives are collected include: 
the future land use element, traffic circulation element, housing element, conservation 
element, recreation and open space element, intergovernmental coordination element, and 
capital improvement element.   Because each policy represents a specific provision or 
restriction that is incorporated into the land development regulations, the count of the 
number of policies indicates the complexity and restrictiveness of growth management 
regulation in a county.      
Our second measure is intended to tap the stability of local land use rules.     
Recent work suggests uncertainty that results from frequent or unpredictable changes in 
regulations greatly increases transaction costs (Feiock and Stream 2001).     Mayer and 
Sommerville conclude that “purely financial regulations such as development fees have a 
much smaller effect on new construction activity than regulations that induce additional 
delays and lengthen the construction process”(2000: 640).   For each plan we tracked and 
recorded the number of amendments each year from 1995-2000.  Most of the 
amendments involve change in land use designations on the land use map. 
Our third measure of growth management policy is the use of urban service 
boundaries in the last two years.  This measure is derived from a mail questionnaire that 
was sent to all 67 county planning directors in Florida in the spring and summer of 2002.   
As of May 24, usable responses were received from 43 counties, a response rate of 64% 
(see Appendix 1).   The three market based growth management policy measures were 
also derived from the county planner’s survey.    The first is an indicator of the use of 
transfer of development rights, the second, whether the county has used incentive zoning, 
and the third is the use of development impact fees in the last two years.    
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Independent Variables.   In order to estimate the growth management policies we 
operationalize a model based on the description of the political economy of growth 
management presented earlier.    The data to estimate this model are drawn from several 
sources.    Demographic characteristics of county populations are included that we expect 
to reflect citizen growth management preferences.   These include population per capita 
personal income, the percent of the county population that is black, the percent of the 
population holding a graduate or professional degree, and the proportion of the 
population with incomes below poverty level.    These citizen characteristics were taken 
from the 1990 Census of population. 
Form of government was measured based on whether or not the county 
government had an elected executive office and whether there was an appointed 
administrator.  We also measure the number of commissioners elected by district rather 
than at large and the number of incorporated municipal governments in the county.  This 
was compiled with data from the International City and County Management Association 
and the National Association of Counties.  Partisanship is measured by the proportion of 
the electorate registered Democrat in 1994 as reported in the Almanac of Florida Politics.    
 
Findings 
 Table 1 below estimates the influence of local institutions and community 
preferences on regulatory policies.  OLS is used to estimate the number of policies 
specified in the comprehensive plan and the number of major amendments to the plan.  
Binary probit was used to estimate the use of urban service boundaries.   Column 1 in 
Table 2 reports estimates for the number of specific restrictions contained in county 
comprehensive plan document.   
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Table 1 here 
 We find mixed support for several of our explanations.   While education had a 
modest effect, there was no evidence that income levels, poverty populations, or percent 
black influenced the restrictiveness of growth management plans.     This result runs 
counter the argument that comprehensive planning is primarily used as a tool of 
exclusion by affluent white citizens.   We also find more restrictive growth management 
plans in large counties.  We find strong support for our hypotheses regarding government 
structure.    The presence of an elected executive has a large positive effect on the number 
of specific policies incorporated within comprehensive plans.     
 Column 2 examines the frequency with which communities alter the land use 
rules contained in the comprehensive plan.   We estimate the number of major 
amendments from 1995-2000 using the same explanatory model.    While the strength of 
the relationships were not as strong, we find that institutional and political factors 
influence change in plans in much the same way they shape the scope of comprehensive 
plans in the first place.    Counties with elected executives and a smaller portion of the 
population voting democratic amend their growth plans most frequently.  This is 
consistent with city level research that finds that government intervention on behalf of 
development and other interests to be common with elected executives (Sharp 2002).     
The results for urban service districts in the third column do not provide support for the 
influence of local government institutions.  
Table 2 here 
 
The adoption of three market based growth management programs are estimated 
in Table 2.   Transfer of development rights was more common in populous counties that 
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are racially and economically homogeneous.  Poverty populations and the percent of the 
population black reduced the likelihood of TDR being employed.   While electoral 
representation structures did not affect any of the regulatory programs in Table 1, it had a 
substantial influence on TDR.   The use of district representation reduced the likelihood 
of adoption of a TDR program.  This may indicate representation of geographic interests 
in local politics makes the types of exchanges and agreements necessary for TDR more 
difficult to achieve. 
We did not find the anticipated relationships between race, income, and incentive 
zoning.  Instead, we find that minority populations reduce the likelihood of incentive 
zoning.    Similarly, the percent of the population black had a negative effect on 
development fees.   Local government institutions had a strong influence on the adoption 
of  impact fees.  Both elected executive and commission administrator systems were 
negatively related to impact fee adoption, indicating that this approach in most popular 
under the commission form of government. 
 
Discussion 
While only a first step, the findings reported here may have implications for the 
study of local land use management.   There is a need to tap multiple dimensions of the 
implementation of growth management programs.  By looking at the scope stability and 
policy tools of growth management regimes together we can gain a more complete 
picture of the forces leading to growth restrictions.    
While Florida’s Growth Management Act defines a standard set of requirements 
for local growth management plans and requires state level approval, there is tremendous 
variation in how local governments carry out these tasks and the restrictiveness of the 
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growth management regimes they institutionalize (Anthony 2000).    Previous work has 
neglected the role political forces and government institutions play in local growth 
policy.   In particular, we find evidence that the elected executive government is linked to 
regulatory approaches to growth management.    This governance institution may offer 
different opportunity structures for local leaders and create incentives for responsiveness 
to anti-growth interests.    On the other hand, the commission form of government 
encourages the use of development impact fees.   The reputation of commission 
government as protective of the status quo is consistent with support for impact fees that 
claim to shift the cost of new development off of current residents.  One unanticipated 
finding is that the size of minority populations is a barrier to the use of market based 
growth management programs that might reduce exclusion and provide affordable 
housing and other social goods.   We find these policies are more likely to be adopted in 
racially more homogenous white counties and not in counties with significant black 
populations.  
This project is an initial step in a journey that we hope will lead us to a better 
understanding what accounts for the use of land use regulation and market based growth 
management policy tools.   There is potential for future work to extend this research to a 
larger set of policy instruments that communities can employ in their efforts to control or 
manage development and to examine the influence of various groups interests and 
organizations in the community.    The alternative policy tools at the disposal of 
governmental decision-makers can produce economically as well as politically efficient 
combinations, which can be achieved by minimizing a series of economic and political 
transaction costs.  
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Table 1 
Regulatory Growth Management Programs 
 
  
Growth Plan 
Regulations  
Growth Plan 
Amendments  
Service 
Boundary   
             
  Coefficient 
Std. 
Error  Coefficient 
Std. 
Error  Coefficient 
Std. 
Error 
             
Population  0.001 * 0.000  -0.001 0.000  0.000  0.000
Income Percapita  0.001 0.005  -0.001 0.000  0.000  0.000
Percent Poverty  -1.008 4.771  -0.006 0.080  -0.239  1.420
Density  0.011 0.046  0.001 0.001  0.001  0.009
Percent Black  26.483 186.681  0.674 3.139  1.140  0.017
Education  0.016 * 0.005  0.000 0.000  0.000  0.751
Democrat  -234.34 166.579  -6.537 * 2.780  -1.351  0.035
Cities  -2.794 3.249  0.079 0.054  0.080  0.362
District Reps  4.519 6.008  0.117 0.100  -0.069  0.087
Elected Executive  125.57 * 50.733  1.657 * 0.848  6.240  0.106
Comission/Adminstrator 29.541 42.658  0.722 0.705  -1.359  0.650
Constant  352.541 181.429  7.775 3.015  5.048  0.492
           
R2  0.59   0.50   0.46   
N  66   66   43   
            
             
 
 26
Table 2 
Market-Based Growth Management Programs 
 
 
    Transfer of        Development 
  Development Rights  Incentive Zoning  Impact Fees 
             
  Coefficient 
Std. 
Error  Coefficient 
Std. 
Error  Coefficient Std. Error 
            
Population  0.000 * 0.000  0.000 * 0.000  0.000  0.000 
Income Percapita  0.000 0.000  -0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
Percent Poverty  -0.396 * 0.303  0.071 0.141  -0.200 0.186 
Density  -0.004 0.009  -0.004 0.004  -0.002 0.004 
Percent Black  -22.261 18.972  -17.011 * 12.594  -33.110 * 17.122 
Education  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
Democrat  28.388 * 19.126  5.714  5.561  1.247 7.707 
Cities  -0.539 0.462  -0.058  0.095  -0.042 0.172 
District Reps  -1.551 * 0.673  -0.186  0.213  -0.065 0.258 
Strong Mayor  18.601 62.048  1.286  1.936  -2.340 * 1.251 
Comission/Adminstrator 14.496 61.911  1.732  1.529  -2.249 * 1.639 
Constant  -25.251 62.802  -4.839  4.801  6.555  7.737 
            
R2  0.73    0.46    0.68   
N  43    43    43   
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APPENDIX 1 
Land Use Planning Survey 2002 
 
 
1. In considering the last five years, how controversial would you say residential development issues 
are in your jurisdiction? Please circle the number preceding one of the following. 
1   NOT AT ALL CONTOVERSIAL 
2   SOMETIMES CONTROVERSIAL 
3   OFTEN CONTROVERSIAL 
4   ALMOST ALWAYS CONTROVERSIAL 
 
2. Which of the following LAND USE MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES (if any) has been used by 
your jurisdiction in the last two years? Circle the numbers preceding all that apply. 
1   CLUSTER DEVELOPMENT 
2   DENSITY BONUS 
3   ENTERPRISE ZONES 
4   FARMLAND PRESERVATION 
5   FLOODPLAIN ZONING 
6   HISTORIC DISTRICT ORDINANCE 
7   IMPACT FEES 
8   LAND ACQUISTION  
9   LAND BANKING 
10   LARGE LOT ZONING 
11   MIXED-USE DEVELOPMENT 
12   OPEN SPACE ZONING 
13   OVERLAY ZONES 
14   PERFORMANCE ZONING 
15   PLANNED UNIT DEVELOPMENT 
16   POPULATION/BUILDING CAPS 
17   PROPERTY TAX ABATEMENT                                  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18   PROVISION OF PUBLIC FACILITIES BY
DEVELOPERS 
 
19   PUBLIC LAND DEDICATION 
 
20   TAX INCENTIVES TO PRESERVE 
AGRICULTURAL USE  
 
21   MANDATORY TRANSFER OF 
DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS 
 
22   VOLUNTARY TRANSFER OF 
DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS 
 
23   URBAN SERVICE BOUNDARIES 
 
24   ZERO LOT LINE HOUSING 
 
25   ZONING TO PRESERVE 
ENVIRONMENTALLY SENSITIVE 
AREAS 
 
26   TRANSIT ORIENTED DEVELOPMENT 
 
27   OTHER (SPECIFY) 
__________________________
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3. Does your jurisdiction impose IMPACT FEES on new development? 
1   NO     IF YOU DO NOT IMPOSE IMPACT FEES, SKIP TO 
QUESTION 7. 
2   YES 
 
 
4. When were impact fees adopted for the first time in your jurisdiction? 
       ________ (YEAR) 
5. What types of impact fees are currently charged by your jurisdiction? Circle all that 
apply. 
1   PARKS AND RECREATION 
2   SCHOOLS 
3   SEWAGE 
4   STORMWATER FACILITIES 
5   TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES 
6   WATER SUPPLY 
7   OTHER(S) (SPECIFY) _____________________ 
 
6. Has the number of government services covered by impact fees changed in your 
jurisdiction during the last five years? Circle the one that best applies. 
1   LARGE INCREASE 
2   SMALL INCREASE 
3   NO CHANGE 
4   SMALL DECREASE 
5   LARGE DECREASE 
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7. If your jurisdiction uses DENSITY BONUSES or INCENTIVE ZONING, what types of 
facilities/services are provided by developers? Circle the numbers preceding all that apply. 
1   PARKS AND RECREATION 
2   DAY CARE CENTERS 
3   LOW INCOME HOUSING 
4   HISTORIC PRESERVATION 
5   JOB TRAINING 
6   RETAIL ACTIVITY AT STREET LEVEL 
7   OTHER(S) (SPECIFY)_________________
 
8. Which of the following, if any, has been used to promote AFFORDABLE HOUSING 
production? Circle  the numbers preceding all that apply. 
1   DIRECT CONSTRUCTION BY YOUR JURISDICTION 
2   REGIONAL CONTRIBUTION AGREEMENT 
3   DENSITY BONUS 
4   REHABILITATION 
5   OTHER (SPECIFY) __________________ 
 
9. What percentage of the following requests were approved during the past 12 months? (Circle the 
range that best applies) 
 
VARIANCES       CONDITIONAL      UPZONING     DOWNZONING 
USE PERMITS     DECISIONS      DECISIONS 
                                                                               (Higher Density)      (Lower Density) 
   0-20%   0-20%    0-20%            0-20% 
21-40%  21-40%    21-40%          21-40% 
41-60%  41-60%    41-60%          41-60%                                                     
61-80%                 61-80%    61-80%          61-80% 
81-100%  81-100%   81-100%          81-100% 
 
10. In your jurisdiction, what is the minimum size (in acres and population) of development 
projects that require the preparation of environmental impact assessments?  
________________ (ACRES) and _________________ (POPULATION) 
 
11. If your jurisdiction has a policy that limits the total number of permits issued in a given year, 
circle all the types of permits that this policy is applied to. 
1   ALL BUILDING PERMITS 
2   SINGLE-FAMILY HOUSING 
3   MULTI-FAMILY HOUSING 
4   OTHER (SPECIFY) _______________________ 
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12. Has your jurisdiction imposed a moratorium on growth in the last two years? 
1   NO, OUR JURISDICTION DOES NOT HAVE SUCH  
 
2   NO, OUR JURISDICTION HAS SUCH POWERS BUT CHOSE NOT TO USE THEM 
 
3   YES 
13. If yes, what is/was the length of the most recent moratorium? 
_________ (MONTHS) 
14. Does the jurisdiction provide one-stop permit issuance for new development? 
1   NO 
2   YES 
15. In thinking about the last five years, would you say that the TIME 
required to complete the review of residential projects in your 
jurisdiction has: 
1   DECREASED 
2   STAYED THE SAME 
3   INCREASED 
4   INCREASED SUBSTANTIALLY 
 
16. Please review the following list of issues and circle the number that you feel best describes the 
extent to which each issue is a priority in your community. (“1” being LOW PRIORITY problem, 
“5” being HIGH PRIORITY problem). 
LOW----------------------------------HIGH 
1   SUPPLY OF LAND FOR RESIDENTIAL USE    1   2   3   4   5 
2   SEWER CAPACITY LIMITS      1   2   3   4   5 
3   WASTEWATER TREATMENT FACILITY 
CAPACITY          1   2   3   4   5  
4   SCHOOL CROWDING      1   2   3   4   5 
5   INSUFFICIENT WATER SUPPLY     1   2   3   4   5 
6   URBAN SPRAWL       1   2   3   4   5 
7   INSUFFICIENT LOW INCOME HOUSING    1   2   3   4   5  
 
17. What influence has the adoption of Land Development Regulations had on the following issues? 
(“1” being LARGE DECREASE, and “5” being LARGE INCREASE): 
DECREASE-------------------------------INCREASE 
1   URBAN SPRAWL    1   2   3   4   5 
2   AFFORDABLE HOUSING UNITS  1   2   3   4   5 
3   NUMBER OF NEW RESIDENTIAL UNITS 1   2   3   4   5 
4   NUMBER OF NEW NON-RESIDENTIAL  
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UNITS     1   2   3   4   5 
 
18. How long would you estimate is the average processing time necessary for new development 
applications from formal application to formal approval, assuming application meets all 
regulatory requirements? 
1   SINGLE FAMILY HOUSING _____________ (MONTHS) 
2   MULTI-FAMILY DWELLINGS ______________ (MONTHS) 
3   COMMERCIAL _____________ (MONTHS) 
4   INDUSTRIAL _____________ (MONTHS) 
 
 
19. How many times in the last 24 months has your jurisdiction offered Tax Abatements?  
1   0   
2   1-5   
3   6-10 
4   MORE THAN 10 
 
20. How many times in the last 24 months has your jurisdiction offered Impact Fee Waivers? 
1   0   
2   1-5   
3   6-10   
4   MORE THAN 10 
21. If your jurisdiction used any of the following REGULATORY POLICIES in the last 5 years, 
how do you rate the stringency of enforcement compared to other communities in the state? 
Please use the following to rate each of the regulatory policies with 1= NOT ENFORCED, 2= WEAK, 
3=MODERATE, 4=STRINGENT and 5= VERY STRINGENT): 
NOT ENFORCED---------------------VERY STRINGENT 
1   PERMITTED LAND USES   1 2 3 4 5 
2   DENSITY OF LAND USE   1 2 3 4 5 
3   SETBACKS     1 2 3 4 5 
4   SITE REVIEW    1 2 3 4 5 
5   SPECIAL STUDY/IMPACT ASSESSMENT 1 2 3 4 5 
6   BUILDING STANDARDS   1 2 3 4 5 
7   MANDATORY REAL ESTATE 
HAZARD DISCLOSURE   1 2 3 4 5 
8   RETROFITTING OF PRIVATE  
STRUCTURES    1 2 3 4 5 
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 22. Does your jurisdiction have a separate capital improvements plan? 
1   NO 
2   YES 
 
23. If your jurisdiction has a separate CAPITAL IMPROVEMENTS PLAN, are capital 
improvements and public works projects used to control the rate or location of residential 
development in your jurisdiction? 
1   NO 
2   YES 
 
24. In general, to what extent is there coordination between the separate departments in the 
jurisdiction on planning and development issues? Please circle the response below that best applies. 
1   ALMOST NO COORDINATION 
2   LOW LEVEL OF COORDINATION 
3   MODERATE LEVEL OF COORDINATION 
4   HIGH LEVEL OF COORDINATION 
 
25. To what extent do economic development and growth management policy goals conflict in your 
jurisdiction? 
1   NOT IN CONFLICT 
2   SOMEWHAT IN CONFLICT 
3   IN CONFLICT 
 
26. To what extent is there competition with neighboring communities to attract economic growth? 
1   NO COMPETITION 
2   SOME COMPETITION 
3   STRONG COMPETITION 
 
27. In general, what is the level of coordination between your jurisdiction and adjacent jurisdictions 
in the implementation of the comprehensive plan? 
1   NO COORDINATION 
2   LOW LEVEL OF COORDINATION 
3   MODERATE LEVEL OF COORDINATION 
4   HIGH LEVEL OF COORDINATION 
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 28. Regarding your jurisdiction’s GROWTH MANAGEMENT GOALS, how supportive are the 
following individuals or groups? Circle the number corresponding to your assessment, where 
1 = Strongly Oppose   2 = Moderately Oppose   3 = Neutral   4 = Moderately Support  5 = Strongly Support. 
OPPOSE----------------------------------------SUPPORT 
1   COUNTY DEPARTMENT HEADS  1 2 3 4 5 
2   COUNTY COMMISSION/LEGISLATURE 1 2 3 4 5 
3   COUNTY MANAGER (IF APPLICABLE) 1 2 3 4 5 
4   CITY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS  1 2 3 4 5 
5   CHAMBER OF COMMERCE   1 2 3 4 5 
6   NEIGHBORHOOD ORGANIZATIONS 1 2 3 4 5 
7   ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPS  1 2 3 4 5 
8   REAL ESTATE DEVLOPERS  1 2 3 4 5 
9   HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION  1 2 3 4 5 
10   LOCAL BUSINESSES   1 2 3 4 5 
11   THE MEDIA    1 2 3 4 5 
12   GENERAL PUBLIC    1 2 3 4 5 
 
29. How supportive of ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT are the following individuals or groups? 
Circle the number corresponding to your assessment? Circle the number corresponding to your 
assessment, where 1 = Strongly Oppose, 2 = Moderately Oppose, 3 = Neutral, 4 = Moderately Support, 
and  5 = Strongly Support. 
OPPOSE----------------------------------------SUPPORT 
1   COUNTY DEPARTMENT HEADS  1 2 3 4 5 
2   COUNTY COMMISSION/LEGISLATURE 1 2 3 4 5 
3   COUNTY MANAGER (IF APPLICABLE) 1 2 3 4 5 
4   CITY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS  1 2 3 4 5 
5   CHAMBER OF COMMERCE   1 2 3 4 5 
6   NEIGHBORHOOD ORGANIZATIONS 1 2 3 4 5 
7   ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPS  1 2 3 4 5 
8   REAL ESTATE DEVLOPERS  1 2 3 4 5 
9   HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION  1 2 3 4 5 
10   LOCAL BUSINESSES   1 2 3 4 5 
11   THE MEDIA    1 2 3 4 5 
12   GENERAL PUBLIC    1 2 3 4 5 
 
30. Which of the following do you believe describes the influence of residential development issues 
on your jurisdiction’s elections? 
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1   GROWTH ISSUES HARDLY EVER AFFECT LOCAL ELECTIONS 
2   THERE HAVE BEEN A FEW TIMES WHEN GROWTH ISSUES HAVE AFFECTED THE 
OUTCOMES OF THE LOCAL ELECTIONS 
 
3   LOCAL GROWTH ISSUES HAVE OFTEN BEEN INFLUENTIAL IN AFFECTING THE 
OUTCOMES OF LOCAL ELECTIONS 
 
 
31. When adopting the comprehensive plan, the County Legislature / Board of Commissioners 
considered the impact of the comprehensive plan on neighboring cities and counties.  
1   STRONGLY DISAGREE 
2   DISAGREE 
3   NEUTRAL 
4   AGREE 
5   STRONGLY AGREE 
 
32. Our jurisdiction uses SANCTIONS/PENALTIES to achieve compliance with the land use 
regulations. 
1   STRONGLY DISAGREE 
2   DISAGREE 
3   NEUTRAL 
4   AGREE 
5   STRONGLY AGREE 
 
33. The implementation of the comprehensive plan has affected the level of the following items. 
Please indicate your assessment by circling the appropriate number where 1=Strongly Disagree, 
2=Disagree, 3=Neutral, 4=Agree, and 5=Strongly Agree. 
STRONGLY     STRONGLY 
DISAGREE--------------------------------------------AGREE 
1   FEES    1 2 3 4 5 
2   PROPERTY TAXES  1 2 3 4 5 
3   BORROWING   1 2 3 4 5 
4   PUBLIC ENTERPRISES  1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
 
 
34. Does your jurisdiction have ENVIRONMENTALLY SENSITIVE LANDS?  
1   NO        IF YOU DO NOT HAVE ENVIRONMENTALLY SENSITIVE  
   LANDS, SKIP TO QUESTION 37. 
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2   YES  
 
 
35. If your jurisdiction uses any of the following REGULATORY TECHNIQUES in 
protecting environmentally sensitive lands, how frequently have the following 
techniques been used in the last 5 years? (where 1 = NEVER, 2 = OCCASIONALLY, and 
3 = ALWAYS) 
                                                                                               NEVER       OCCASIONALLY    ALWAYS 
1   TRANSFER OF DEVELOPMENT 
RIGHTS    1  2  3 
2   ORDINANCE THAT LIMITS LAND 
CLEARING    1  2  3 
3   ORDINANCE PROTECTING 
WETLANDS    1  2  3 
4   MANDATORY SETBACK FROM 
SHORE     1  2  3 
5   EROSION CONTROL ORDINANCE 1  2  3 
6   SUBMISSION CONTROL ORDINANCE 1  2  3 
7   LARGE LOT ZONING   1  2  3 
8   CLUSTER DEVELOPMENT  1  2  3 
 
36. How frequently were the following NON-REGULATORY TECHNIQUES to protect 
environmentally sensitive lands used in the last 5 years? (where 1 = NEVER, 2 = 
OCCASIONALLY, and 3 = ALWAYS) 
NEVER      OCCASIONALLY    ALWAYS 
1   LAND ACQUISITION   1  2  3 
2   VOLUNTARY AGREEMENTS WITH 
LANDOWNERS    1  2  3 
3   VOLUNTARY MANGEMENT PLUS 1  2  3 
4   LANDOWNER INFORMATION  1  2  3 
5   OTHER (SPECIFY) _______________ 1  2  3 
 
 
 
 
 
37. What role has the STATE GOVERNMENT played in influencing land use planning in your 
jurisdiction in terms of: (Use a scale where 1 = VERY WEAK SUPPORT and 5 = VERY STRONG 
SUPPORT) 
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     WEAK SUPPORT---------------STRONG SUPPORT 
1   DEFINING SPECIFIC GOALS 1 2 3 4 5 
2   ESTABLISHING A  
 HIERARCHY OF GOALS  1 2 3 4 5 
3   PROVIDING INCENTIVES 
 TO INDUCE COMPLIANCE  1 2 3 4 5 
4   CREATING SANCTIONS TO 
 COERCE COMPLIANCE  1 2 3 4 5 
 
38. In the development of LDRs based on the comprehensive plan, the STATE GOVERNMENT 
has provided support that is: (Use scale, 1= VERY WEAK, 5=VERY STRONG): 
         WEAK----------------------------------------STRONG 
1   TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 1   2   3   4   5 
2   STAFF TRAINING  1   2   3   4   5 
3   FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE 1   2   3   4   5 
4   SUPPORT IN THE   
 DEVELOPMENT OF  
 DATABASES AND MAP 1   2   3   4   5 
 
39. In the development of LDRs based on the comprehensive plan, the REGIONAL PLANNING 
COMMISSION has provided support that is (Use scale): 
WEAK------------------------------------------ STRONG 
1   TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 1   2   3   4   5 
2   STAFF TRAINING  1   2   3   4   5 
3   FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE 1   2   3   4   5 
4   SUPPORT IN THE   
 DEVELOPMENT OF  
 DATABASES AND MAP 1   2   3   4   5 
 
 
 
40. Has your jurisdiction been granted exemptions from the transportation 
concurrency requirement of the state growth management mandate? 
1   NO 
2   YES 
 
 
 
41. Which of the following best describes the planning office in your jurisdiction? 
1   WE HAVE A SEPARATE, IN-HOUSE PLANNING DEPARTMENT/OFFICE 
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2   WE HAVE A SEPARATE, IN-HOUSE PLANNING DEPARTMENT/OFFICE, BUT WE 
PRIMARILY CONTRACT FOR THIS SERVICE 
3   WE HAVE A PLANNING DEPARTMENT, BUT IT IS PART  OF ANOTHER UNIT IN 
OUR JURISDICTION 
 
42. What is the approximate number of full-time planning and growth management personnel 
employed by your jurisdiction at least 9 months a year? __________ 
A.   How many full-time staff are devoted to reviewing development proposals, including 
standard or routine proposals as well as requests for variances, amendments, 
exemptions, or other departures from existing policies? __________ 
 
43. What is the government structure of your jurisdiction? 
1   COUNCIL-MANAGER 
2   MAYOR-COUNCIL 
3   OTHER (specify) ________________ 
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 44. Date of comprehensive plan implementation by LAND DEVELOPMENT 
REGULATIONS (LDRs):   
____________(MONTH) _________ (YEAR) 
 
45. Which, if any, of the following techniques has the jurisdiction used to obtain CITIZEN INPUT 
into the REVISION(S) OR AMENDMENTS TO THE COMPREHENSIVE PLAN? Circle all 
that were used. 
1   APPOINTED ADVISORY GROUPS 
2   PUBLIC HEARINGS 
3   OPEN WORKSHOPS OR FORUMS 
4   CITIZEN SURVEYS 
5   OTHER (SPECIFY) ____________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 0
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